Supreme Court Rejects Automatic Gun Ban for Marijuana Users
Jun 18, 2025 - Posted by Larry E. Holtz, Esq.
In United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. ___ (No. 24-1234; June 18, 2026), the United States Supreme Court addressed the question whether the Second Amendment is violated by the government’s prosecution of a person for possessing a firearm solely because he is a regular marijuana user. The Court said yes. As applied to Hemani, the prosecution violated the Second Amendment. The government may not constitutionally apply 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) to automatically disarm and prosecute a person merely because he regularly uses marijuana, absent proof that the person is addicted, presently intoxicated, dangerous, incapacitated, unable to manage his affairs, or likely to misuse a firearm. Regular marijuana use alone is insufficient to justify stripping a person of the Second Amendment right to possess a firearm in the home for self-defense.
The Case: Ali Hemani was a dual citizen of the United States and Pakistan who lived in Texas with his parents and held a stable job. In 2022, the government searched the family home based on suspected terrorism-related activities. During the search, Hemani cooperated with law enforcement. He surrendered a gun kept in the home, pointed agents to marijuana on the property, and consented to an interview. He told agents that he used marijuana “about every other day.” Agents also found cocaine in his parents’ closet. Hemani claimed ownership of the cocaine but said his mother had hidden it from him and that he had not used it recently.
More than six months later, the government charged Hemani with a single count under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): knowingly possessing a firearm while being an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance. The charge was based solely on his admitted marijuana use. The government did not charge him with terrorism, drug trafficking, cocaine possession, or misuse of the firearm. The government also did not claim that Hemani was addicted to drugs, that his marijuana use made him dangerous, that he had ever used the gun while intoxicated, or that he had done anything with the gun other than possess it in his home.
The Law: Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), it is unlawful for any person who is an “unlawful user of” or “addicted to” a controlled substance to possess a firearm. The statute incorporates the Controlled Substances Act’s schedules. Therefore, a person who unlawfully uses any scheduled drug may fall within the prohibition. A violation can subject the person to up to 15 years’ imprisonment. A conviction can also result in lifetime firearm disability under § 922(g)(1).
As held in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008), the Second Amendment protects the individual right of Americans to keep and bear arms for self-defense. Under New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 17 (2022), once the Second Amendment’s text covers the conduct at issue, the government must prove that the challenged regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Moreover, under United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024), the government does not need to identify a perfect historical twin. But it must show that the modern law is relevantly similar to historical analogues in both why the law burdens armed self-defense and how it does so.
Here, the Court held that Hemani’s firearm possession was presumptively protected. In this regard, the government conceded that § 922(g)(3), as applied here, burdened conduct covered by the Second Amendment. The statute barred Hemani from possessing essentially any firearm for any purpose, including a gun kept in his home for self-defense. That meant the government had the burden to justify the prosecution through historical tradition.
To support its position, the government relied on “habitual drunkard” laws, arguing that § 922(g)(3) was analogous to historical laws regulating “habitual drunkards,” which showed a historical tradition of restricting dangerous intoxicated persons and supported modern disarmament of unlawful drug users. In rejecting this analogy, the Court emphasized that historical “habitual drunkard” laws did not apply merely to people who drank regularly or frequently. They generally applied to persons whose drinking rendered them practically incapacitated, unable to manage their affairs, lacking self-control, or dangerous to themselves or others.
By contrast, the government’s reading of § 922(g)(3) reached any person who regularly used any amount of any controlled substance for a non-prescribed purpose. The government did not need to prove incapacitation, addiction, inability to manage affairs, or danger. This mismatch was especially clear in Hemani’s case. Hemani admitted using marijuana about every other day, but the record did not show how much he used, how potent it was, whether it impaired him, whether he was unable to manage his affairs, or whether he posed a risk to anyone. The government’s theory treated all regular marijuana users like historical habitual drunkards, and the Court found that analogy deficient.
The Court also found a major difference in how the laws worked. The historical laws served different purposes and operated differently. Vagrancy, guardianship, commitment, and surety laws often addressed poverty, dependency, moral disorder, family protection, or public scandal—not categorical firearm dangerousness. They also usually required some form of judicial process before liberty was restricted: a conviction, a probate proceeding, a judicial determination, or a surety hearing. By contrast, § 922(g)(3) imposes an automatic firearm disability without any individualized finding of danger. No pre-deprivation hearing or individualized determination of dangerousness is required. The Court acknowledged that a defendant prosecuted under § 922(g)(3) receives a criminal trial before imprisonment, but that did not solve the problem. The relevant Second Amendment burden—the automatic disarmament—occurs before any individualized judicial process.
During the course of its opinion, the Court also emphasized that the case is a narrow one. It did not decide:
- Whether Congress may disarm drug addicts;
- Whether Congress may disarm persons who are presently intoxicated while possessing firearms;
- Whether Congress may enact narrower laws targeting users of particular drugs shown to create special firearm risks;
- Whether § 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession statute, is valid;
- Whether the government could prosecute under § 922(g)(3) with individualized proof that the defendant’s drug use makes him dangerous; or
- Whether a particular drug might be shown to render users dangerous because of potency or other characteristics.
The Court held only that the government could not automatically prosecute Hemani for possessing a firearm solely because he regularly used marijuana, without more.