NJ Appellate Court Rules the “Reckless Disregard” Portion of the Terroristic Threat Statute Unconstitutional
December 9, 2021 - Posted by Larry Holtz, Esq.
Subsection (a) of N.J.S. 2C:12-3, New Jersey’s terroristic threat statute, provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another * * * or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience. * * *
In State v. Fair (App.Div. 12-9-2021), the Appellate Division held that “[t]he reckless-disregard portion of N.J.S. 2C:12-3(a) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it has the capacity to criminalize speech and expressions protected by the First Amendment.
The case involved threats made to the officers who responded to a domestic violence incident at the defendant’s home.
In its analysis of the statute, the court reasoned that the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), strongly suggests the “reckless disregard” element in 2C:12-3(a) is unconstitutionally overbroad. “To be a true threat – and, by being a true threat, falling outside the First Amendment’s protection – a speaker must ‘mean to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.’” According to the court in Fair, “it is not enough that a reasonable person might have understood the words as a threat – a jury must find that the speaker actually intended to convey a threat.”
“Because N.J.S. 2C:12-3(a) permits a conviction for uttering a threat ‘in reckless disregard of the risk of causing . . . terror,’ it unconstitutionally encompasses speech and expression that do not constitute a ‘true threat’ and, therefore, prohibits the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.”
The court also noted that New Jersey’s state constitution may also require the result reached here. “Our state constitution contains a free speech clause that has been described as being ‘broader than practically all others in the nation,’ Green Party v. Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc., 164 N.J. 127, 145 (2000), and is understood as offering “greater protection than the First Amendment.” See N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 6 (providing that “[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right [and] [n]o law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press”).
Subsection (a) of N.J.S. 2C:12-3, New Jersey’s terroristic threat statute, provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another * * * or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience. * * *
In State v. Fair (App.Div. 12-9-2021), the Appellate Division held that “[t]he reckless-disregard portion of N.J.S. 2C:12-3(a) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it has the capacity to criminalize speech and expressions protected by the First Amendment.
The case involved threats made to the officers who responded to a domestic violence incident at the defendant’s home.
In its analysis of the statute, the court reasoned that the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), strongly suggests the “reckless disregard” element in 2C:12-3(a) is unconstitutionally overbroad. “To be a true threat – and, by being a true threat, falling outside the First Amendment’s protection – a speaker must ‘mean to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.’” According to the court in Fair, “it is not enough that a reasonable person might have understood the words as a threat – a jury must find that the speaker actually intended to convey a threat.”
“Because N.J.S. 2C:12-3(a) permits a conviction for uttering a threat ‘in reckless disregard of the risk of causing . . . terror,’ it unconstitutionally encompasses speech and expression that do not constitute a ‘true threat’ and, therefore, prohibits the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.”
The court also noted that New Jersey’s state constitution may also require the result reached here. “Our state constitution contains a free speech clause that has been described as being ‘broader than practically all others in the nation,’ Green Party v. Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc., 164 N.J. 127, 145 (2000), and is understood as offering “greater protection than the First Amendment.” See N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 6 (providing that “[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right [and] [n]o law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press”).