Clarifying the “License Plate Frame” Issue
August 5, 2021 - Posted by Larry E. Holtz, Esq.
Walk through any crowded parking lot and look carefully at the license plates. Many if not most of them have frames that cover up part of the markings on the plate. Car dealers throughout the State supply many of those frames to advertise their dealerships. A variety of other organizations do likewise. In some instances, an entire phrase, like “Garden State,” is covered by the frame. In other cases, only a very small part of “New Jersey” or “Garden State” is covered, and the words are entirely legible.
In State v. Carter, (8-2-2021), the New Jersey Supreme Court combined two cases to decide the reach of N.J.S. 39:3-33 as it applies to license plate frames. In pertinent part, N.J.S. 39:3-33 reads as follows:
"No person shall drive a motor vehicle which has a license plate frame or identification marker holder that conceals or otherwise obscures any part of any marking imprinted upon the vehicle's registration plate …" [Emphasis added.]
In the first case, officers stopped Darius Carter while he was driving because the words “Garden State” were covered on the car’s license plate, a suspected violation of N.J.S. 39:3-33. Carter was driving without a license, and the police learned that he had two outstanding arrest warrants. The police arrested Carter and later found about one-half ounce of heroin and a small amount of cocaine on him.
In the second case, while driving right behind Roman-Rosado, an officer noticed a license plate bracket around the rear license plate that partially covered the words “Garden State.” The frame covered about ten or fifteen percent of the bottom of the letters, but the officer could clearly recognize the words “Garden State.” The officer stopped the car based on a suspected violation of N.J.S. 39:3-33, and an investigation at the scene of the stop led to the arrest of Roman-Rosado due to two outstanding arrest warrants. A subsequent search of a “white garment” in the vehicle uncovered an unloaded handgun.
In this appeal, the State argued that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop both defendants. According to the State, “the plain language of N.J.S. 39:3-33” suggests that “the statute is violated whenever a frame or holder covers any part of any marking on a license plate, even if the plate is still readable,” including “the words ‘Garden State’ and not just the registration number on a plate.” The NJ Supreme Court refused to adopt such a broad reading of the statute.
According to the Court, reading the statute as broadly as the State suggests “raises serious constitutional concerns. Roman-Rosado was stopped for driving a car with a license plate frame that covered ten to fifteen percent of the bottom of the phrase ‘Garden State.’ But the words, like the rest of the markings on the plate, were fully recognizable.” In this regard, the Court observed:
"License plate frames abound, and they invariably cover some part of the markings on the plates they surround. Frames supplied by dealerships, booster organizations, non-profit groups, and others often cover the bottom of “Garden State” or the very top of “New Jersey.” Simply driving a car off the dealer’s lot with that type of license plate frame would amount to a violation and give officers a basis to stop the car. And if the proposed broad reading of section 33 were the standard, tens if not hundreds of thousands of New Jersey drivers would be in violation of the law."
To the extent that N.J.S. 39:3-33 has two meanings—a narrow one that focuses on whether a license plate is legible, and a broader one that raises serious constitutional issues”—the Court construed the statute “in a way that conforms to the Constitution,” and adopted “the narrower reading.”
Accordingly, the Court held that N.J.S. 39:3-33 “requires that all markings on a license plate be legible or identifiable. … If a license plate frame or holder conceals or obscures a marking such that a person cannot reasonably identify or discern the imprinted information, the driver would be in violation of the law.”
Thus, “a frame cannot cover any of the plate’s features to the point that a person cannot reasonably identify a marking. So, for example, if even a part of a single registration letter or number on a license plate is covered and not legible, the statute would apply because each of those characters is a separate marking. If ‘Garden State,’ ‘New Jersey,’ or some other phrase is covered to the point that the phrase cannot be identified, the law would likewise apply. But if those phrases were partly covered yet still recognizable, there would be no violation.”
In applying the above test, the Court held that “Roman-Rosado did not violate the statute. The officer who stopped Roman-Rosado testified that only ten or fifteen percent of the words ‘Garden State’ were obstructed, and he conceded he could clearly identify the phrase on the license plate. The trial judge found the plate was ‘without question’ ‘a readable license plate.’ … Because ‘Garden State’ was not ‘conceal[ed] or otherwise obscur[ed]’ within the meaning of section 33, and all features of the plate were legible, … the stop was unlawful.”
“In Carter’s case, however, it is undisputed that ‘Garden State’ was entirely covered. As a result, the plate violated the statute, and law enforcement officers had the right to stop Carter.” Id. In so deciding, the Court also rejected Carter’s contention that the statute violated his rights under the First Amendment by requiring him to display the state motto, “Garden State.” In this regard, Carter did not provide any statement or certification that he disagrees with the expression “Garden State” or finds it “morally objectionable.” Compare Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 1435-36 (1977) (holding that the State of New Hampshire could not require motorists to display the state motto, “Live Free or Die,” upon their vehicle license plates).
In Roman-Rosado’s case, the State argued in the alternative that the officer made a reasonable mistake of law in interpreting section 33. Relying on the federal Supreme Court’s ruling in Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S.Ct. 530 (2014), the State contended that the stop and resulting conviction, based on a reasonable but mistaken interpretation of the law, should be upheld. The NJ Supreme Court declined to adopt the standard set forth in Heien under the New Jersey Constitution. “Under Article I, Paragraph 7 of the State Constitution, it is simply not reasonable to restrict someone’s liberty for behavior that no actual law condemns, even when an officer mistakenly, although reasonably, misinterprets the meaning of a statute. Because there was no lawful basis to stop Roman-Rosado, evidence seized as a direct result of the stop must be suppressed.”
Walk through any crowded parking lot and look carefully at the license plates. Many if not most of them have frames that cover up part of the markings on the plate. Car dealers throughout the State supply many of those frames to advertise their dealerships. A variety of other organizations do likewise. In some instances, an entire phrase, like “Garden State,” is covered by the frame. In other cases, only a very small part of “New Jersey” or “Garden State” is covered, and the words are entirely legible.
In State v. Carter, (8-2-2021), the New Jersey Supreme Court combined two cases to decide the reach of N.J.S. 39:3-33 as it applies to license plate frames. In pertinent part, N.J.S. 39:3-33 reads as follows:
"No person shall drive a motor vehicle which has a license plate frame or identification marker holder that conceals or otherwise obscures any part of any marking imprinted upon the vehicle's registration plate …" [Emphasis added.]
In the first case, officers stopped Darius Carter while he was driving because the words “Garden State” were covered on the car’s license plate, a suspected violation of N.J.S. 39:3-33. Carter was driving without a license, and the police learned that he had two outstanding arrest warrants. The police arrested Carter and later found about one-half ounce of heroin and a small amount of cocaine on him.
In the second case, while driving right behind Roman-Rosado, an officer noticed a license plate bracket around the rear license plate that partially covered the words “Garden State.” The frame covered about ten or fifteen percent of the bottom of the letters, but the officer could clearly recognize the words “Garden State.” The officer stopped the car based on a suspected violation of N.J.S. 39:3-33, and an investigation at the scene of the stop led to the arrest of Roman-Rosado due to two outstanding arrest warrants. A subsequent search of a “white garment” in the vehicle uncovered an unloaded handgun.
In this appeal, the State argued that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop both defendants. According to the State, “the plain language of N.J.S. 39:3-33” suggests that “the statute is violated whenever a frame or holder covers any part of any marking on a license plate, even if the plate is still readable,” including “the words ‘Garden State’ and not just the registration number on a plate.” The NJ Supreme Court refused to adopt such a broad reading of the statute.
According to the Court, reading the statute as broadly as the State suggests “raises serious constitutional concerns. Roman-Rosado was stopped for driving a car with a license plate frame that covered ten to fifteen percent of the bottom of the phrase ‘Garden State.’ But the words, like the rest of the markings on the plate, were fully recognizable.” In this regard, the Court observed:
"License plate frames abound, and they invariably cover some part of the markings on the plates they surround. Frames supplied by dealerships, booster organizations, non-profit groups, and others often cover the bottom of “Garden State” or the very top of “New Jersey.” Simply driving a car off the dealer’s lot with that type of license plate frame would amount to a violation and give officers a basis to stop the car. And if the proposed broad reading of section 33 were the standard, tens if not hundreds of thousands of New Jersey drivers would be in violation of the law."
To the extent that N.J.S. 39:3-33 has two meanings—a narrow one that focuses on whether a license plate is legible, and a broader one that raises serious constitutional issues”—the Court construed the statute “in a way that conforms to the Constitution,” and adopted “the narrower reading.”
Accordingly, the Court held that N.J.S. 39:3-33 “requires that all markings on a license plate be legible or identifiable. … If a license plate frame or holder conceals or obscures a marking such that a person cannot reasonably identify or discern the imprinted information, the driver would be in violation of the law.”
Thus, “a frame cannot cover any of the plate’s features to the point that a person cannot reasonably identify a marking. So, for example, if even a part of a single registration letter or number on a license plate is covered and not legible, the statute would apply because each of those characters is a separate marking. If ‘Garden State,’ ‘New Jersey,’ or some other phrase is covered to the point that the phrase cannot be identified, the law would likewise apply. But if those phrases were partly covered yet still recognizable, there would be no violation.”
In applying the above test, the Court held that “Roman-Rosado did not violate the statute. The officer who stopped Roman-Rosado testified that only ten or fifteen percent of the words ‘Garden State’ were obstructed, and he conceded he could clearly identify the phrase on the license plate. The trial judge found the plate was ‘without question’ ‘a readable license plate.’ … Because ‘Garden State’ was not ‘conceal[ed] or otherwise obscur[ed]’ within the meaning of section 33, and all features of the plate were legible, … the stop was unlawful.”
“In Carter’s case, however, it is undisputed that ‘Garden State’ was entirely covered. As a result, the plate violated the statute, and law enforcement officers had the right to stop Carter.” Id. In so deciding, the Court also rejected Carter’s contention that the statute violated his rights under the First Amendment by requiring him to display the state motto, “Garden State.” In this regard, Carter did not provide any statement or certification that he disagrees with the expression “Garden State” or finds it “morally objectionable.” Compare Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 1435-36 (1977) (holding that the State of New Hampshire could not require motorists to display the state motto, “Live Free or Die,” upon their vehicle license plates).
In Roman-Rosado’s case, the State argued in the alternative that the officer made a reasonable mistake of law in interpreting section 33. Relying on the federal Supreme Court’s ruling in Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S.Ct. 530 (2014), the State contended that the stop and resulting conviction, based on a reasonable but mistaken interpretation of the law, should be upheld. The NJ Supreme Court declined to adopt the standard set forth in Heien under the New Jersey Constitution. “Under Article I, Paragraph 7 of the State Constitution, it is simply not reasonable to restrict someone’s liberty for behavior that no actual law condemns, even when an officer mistakenly, although reasonably, misinterprets the meaning of a statute. Because there was no lawful basis to stop Roman-Rosado, evidence seized as a direct result of the stop must be suppressed.”
License Plate Cover in Roman-Rosado's Case