NJ Supreme Court Rules on Investigative Detention Case in “High-Crime Area”
October 13, 2022 - Posted by Ed Esposito
Recently, the NJ Supreme Court issued a ruling in State v. Goldsmith (A-77-20) finding that the information the officers possessed at the time of the stop did not amount to specific and particularized suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity. The Court reversed an appellate court decision in this matter because it did not address the initial stop when it decided the frisk of the defendant was objectively reasonable. As a result of their findings, the Supreme Court decided that the evidence found in the defendant’s possession could not be used against him.
As a quick review, it is well-settled by our courts that an investigative detention or the so-called, “Terry stop,” is a relatively brief detention by police during which a person’s movement is restricted (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). A Terry stop of a person by the police is permissible if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
In State v. Goldsmith two officers were on patrol in what they believed to be a “high-crime area” because of its reputation for shootings and drug dealing. The officers observed two individuals standing in front of a vacant house in this “high-crime area” and when they exited their vehicle, the two individuals walked away. Simultaneously, a third person, the defendant in this case, exited the walkway that leads to the rear of the vacant house.
The officer who stopped the defendant did so based on his training, 20 years of experience, and his belief that the vacant house was used for the sale of drugs and weapons. The officer found it suspicious that the defendant was on the walkway next to the vacant house. Believing the defendant was engaged in drug dealing activity, the officers approached and blocked his path at the end of the walkway. Next, the officers asked for his name and for an explanation of his presence on the walkway. The defendant then became nervous and looked up and down the street. The defendant was sweating, and his hands began to shake.
Although the defendant provided a name and said his identification was in his jacket pocket, his demeanor resulted in the officer telling him that he would retrieve the identification himself. In response, the defendant stated, “I appreciate if you guys didn’t pat me down.” This increased the officer’s suspicions even further and resulted in a pat down for weapons. The officer felt a weapon in defendant’s jacket pocket and then retrieved a handgun. The police located currency and drugs from defendant’s person in a search incident to his arrest. The officers also located CDS in baggies that were the same color as the baggies of CDS found on the defendant’s person.
According to the Court, “[a]lthough [the] officers did not tell [the] defendant to “stop” when he exited the walkway, the two officers blocked his path, and [one officer] acknowledged that [the] defendant could not have moved forward freely at that point.” Ibid. “The officers then began asking defendant a series of questions about who he was and where he was coming from.” Ibid. An “[officer] testified that [the] defendant was free to leave and could have turned around and “run back up that walkway.”” Ibid. The Court ruled that “[t]he moment officers impeded [the defendant’s] forward progress and began the questioning, the encounter became an investigatory detention or stop.” Ibid.
After determining when the Terry stop actually began, the Court next examined if the officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant at that point in time. With respect to the area being a "high-crime area,” the Court declined to “abandon presence in a high-crime area as a factor in determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists.” However, the Court stated, “[w]e continue to view the impact of previous crimes in the same area as a police encounter as a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a stop was based on reasonable suspicion.” Ibid. (Emphasis added). The State relied on the defendant’s actions prior to their encounter with the officers in a “high-crime area” as the basis for the Terry stop. The Court noted in the course of their decision that “[t]hree people standing on the street interacting with each other, whether in a high- crime neighborhood or not, is not suggestive of criminal activity without more.” Ibid. (Emphasis added).
Since the Court held that Terry stop of the defendant was unlawful, they did not rule on whether officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to frisk defendant.
Recently, the NJ Supreme Court issued a ruling in State v. Goldsmith (A-77-20) finding that the information the officers possessed at the time of the stop did not amount to specific and particularized suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity. The Court reversed an appellate court decision in this matter because it did not address the initial stop when it decided the frisk of the defendant was objectively reasonable. As a result of their findings, the Supreme Court decided that the evidence found in the defendant’s possession could not be used against him.
As a quick review, it is well-settled by our courts that an investigative detention or the so-called, “Terry stop,” is a relatively brief detention by police during which a person’s movement is restricted (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). A Terry stop of a person by the police is permissible if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
In State v. Goldsmith two officers were on patrol in what they believed to be a “high-crime area” because of its reputation for shootings and drug dealing. The officers observed two individuals standing in front of a vacant house in this “high-crime area” and when they exited their vehicle, the two individuals walked away. Simultaneously, a third person, the defendant in this case, exited the walkway that leads to the rear of the vacant house.
The officer who stopped the defendant did so based on his training, 20 years of experience, and his belief that the vacant house was used for the sale of drugs and weapons. The officer found it suspicious that the defendant was on the walkway next to the vacant house. Believing the defendant was engaged in drug dealing activity, the officers approached and blocked his path at the end of the walkway. Next, the officers asked for his name and for an explanation of his presence on the walkway. The defendant then became nervous and looked up and down the street. The defendant was sweating, and his hands began to shake.
Although the defendant provided a name and said his identification was in his jacket pocket, his demeanor resulted in the officer telling him that he would retrieve the identification himself. In response, the defendant stated, “I appreciate if you guys didn’t pat me down.” This increased the officer’s suspicions even further and resulted in a pat down for weapons. The officer felt a weapon in defendant’s jacket pocket and then retrieved a handgun. The police located currency and drugs from defendant’s person in a search incident to his arrest. The officers also located CDS in baggies that were the same color as the baggies of CDS found on the defendant’s person.
According to the Court, “[a]lthough [the] officers did not tell [the] defendant to “stop” when he exited the walkway, the two officers blocked his path, and [one officer] acknowledged that [the] defendant could not have moved forward freely at that point.” Ibid. “The officers then began asking defendant a series of questions about who he was and where he was coming from.” Ibid. An “[officer] testified that [the] defendant was free to leave and could have turned around and “run back up that walkway.”” Ibid. The Court ruled that “[t]he moment officers impeded [the defendant’s] forward progress and began the questioning, the encounter became an investigatory detention or stop.” Ibid.
After determining when the Terry stop actually began, the Court next examined if the officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant at that point in time. With respect to the area being a "high-crime area,” the Court declined to “abandon presence in a high-crime area as a factor in determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists.” However, the Court stated, “[w]e continue to view the impact of previous crimes in the same area as a police encounter as a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a stop was based on reasonable suspicion.” Ibid. (Emphasis added). The State relied on the defendant’s actions prior to their encounter with the officers in a “high-crime area” as the basis for the Terry stop. The Court noted in the course of their decision that “[t]hree people standing on the street interacting with each other, whether in a high- crime neighborhood or not, is not suggestive of criminal activity without more.” Ibid. (Emphasis added).
Since the Court held that Terry stop of the defendant was unlawful, they did not rule on whether officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to frisk defendant.