Tinted Windows and Traffic Stops
July 1, 2022 - Posted by Larry E. Holtz, Esq.
In State v. Smith (2022), the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified when an officer’s observation of a motor vehicle’s tinted windows will justify a traffic stop.
At approximately 10:20 p.m., four Trenton detectives, who were assigned to the Street Crimes Unit, stopped defendant David Smith’s Ford Taurus for a tinted windows violation after the detectives observed dark tinting on defendant’s rear windshield. “Despite the rear windshield’s tint, the detectives were able to see that defendant was alone in the car and was making a furtive ‘shoving’ motion, raising suspicions that he was trying to conceal a weapon.” Id. The detectives stopped and searched defendant’s vehicle, finding, between the front seat and the console, a .38 caliber revolver loaded with hollow-point bullets.
Defendant was cited for the tinted windows violation and was charged with various weapons offenses. Subsequently, he moved to suppress the evidence, “arguing that the motor vehicle stop was unlawful because the detectives could not have had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the tinting on defendant’s rear windshield violated N.J.S. 39:3-74.” Id. The trial court denied the motion and the Appellate Division affirmed.
Upon further appeal, the NJ Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the stop was not supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation.” Id.
According to the Court, “N.J.S. 39:3-75, which governs automotive safety glass, does not apply to window tint violations.” Id. Moreover, “consistent with the plain language of N.J.S. 39:3-74,” the Court held that a “reasonable and articulable suspicion of a tinted windows violation arises only when a vehicle’s front windshield or front side windows are so darkly tinted that police cannot clearly see people or articles within the car.” Id.
N.J.S. 39:3-74 prohibits operation of a vehicle with any “non-transparent material” on the front windshield or front side windows. Although the statute predates automotive window tinting, it has served as a statutory basis for tinted window citations. See State v. Cohen, 347 N.J. Super. 375, 379-81 (App. Div. 2002). The statute provides in pertinent part:
“No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sign, poster, sticker or other non-transparent material upon the front windshield, wings, deflectors, side shields, corner lights adjoining windshield or front side windows of such vehicle other than a certificate or other article required to be so displayed by statute or by regulations of the commissioner. No person shall drive any vehicle so constructed, equipped or loaded as to unduly interfere with the driver’s vision to the front and to the sides.” N.J.S 39-3:74.
In State v. Cohen, the Appellate Division upheld a finding of reasonable suspicion based on an officer’s observation that the front driver and passenger side windows “were so darkly tinted as to obstruct vision.” 347 N.J.Super. at 380. Relying on State v. Oberlton, 262 N.J.Super. 204 (Law Div. 1992), the court held that “N.J.S. 39:3-74 prohibits the use of tinted windows which fail to meet the applicable standard now set forth in N.J.A.C. 13:20-33.7,” which, at the time, established inspection requirements for passenger vehicles. The Appellate Division further cited “the community caretaking function” as an independent basis for the stop, because “the officer’s belief that the darkly tinted windows represented a significant obstruction” justified “inspection of what appear[ed] to be a hazardous vehicular condition that deviate[d] from the norm.” Cohen at 381.
Here, in Smith, the arresting officers observed window tint on the rear windshield of defendant’s vehicle. “Under the statute’s plain language,” held the Court, “the tint on defendant’s rear windshield could not constitute a violation of N.J.S. 39:3-74. It did not give rise to the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to justify this motor vehicle stop.” Id. Rather, the term “non-transparent,” as used in N.J.S. 39:3-74, “means that reasonable suspicion of a tinted windows violation arises when a vehicle’s front windshield or front side windows are so darkly tinted that police cannot clearly see people or articles within the car.” Id.
The facts of this case provide an example of window tint that does not meet the definition of the statutory term “non-transparent.” The officer testified that, “despite the tinting on defendant’s rear windshield, he was able to see with just the police SUV’s headlights and street lighting that there was only one person in the vehicle and that the person was making movements. Such a degree of window tint — which allows the officer to see both the number of people in the vehicle and their movements — is not ‘non-transparent’ within the meaning of the statute. In order to establish a reasonable suspicion of a tinted windows violation under N.J.S. 39:3-74, the State will therefore need to present evidence that tinting on the front windshield or front side windows inhibited officers’ ability to clearly see the vehicle's occupants or articles inside.” Id.
In State v. Smith (2022), the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified when an officer’s observation of a motor vehicle’s tinted windows will justify a traffic stop.
At approximately 10:20 p.m., four Trenton detectives, who were assigned to the Street Crimes Unit, stopped defendant David Smith’s Ford Taurus for a tinted windows violation after the detectives observed dark tinting on defendant’s rear windshield. “Despite the rear windshield’s tint, the detectives were able to see that defendant was alone in the car and was making a furtive ‘shoving’ motion, raising suspicions that he was trying to conceal a weapon.” Id. The detectives stopped and searched defendant’s vehicle, finding, between the front seat and the console, a .38 caliber revolver loaded with hollow-point bullets.
Defendant was cited for the tinted windows violation and was charged with various weapons offenses. Subsequently, he moved to suppress the evidence, “arguing that the motor vehicle stop was unlawful because the detectives could not have had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the tinting on defendant’s rear windshield violated N.J.S. 39:3-74.” Id. The trial court denied the motion and the Appellate Division affirmed.
Upon further appeal, the NJ Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the stop was not supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation.” Id.
According to the Court, “N.J.S. 39:3-75, which governs automotive safety glass, does not apply to window tint violations.” Id. Moreover, “consistent with the plain language of N.J.S. 39:3-74,” the Court held that a “reasonable and articulable suspicion of a tinted windows violation arises only when a vehicle’s front windshield or front side windows are so darkly tinted that police cannot clearly see people or articles within the car.” Id.
N.J.S. 39:3-74 prohibits operation of a vehicle with any “non-transparent material” on the front windshield or front side windows. Although the statute predates automotive window tinting, it has served as a statutory basis for tinted window citations. See State v. Cohen, 347 N.J. Super. 375, 379-81 (App. Div. 2002). The statute provides in pertinent part:
“No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any sign, poster, sticker or other non-transparent material upon the front windshield, wings, deflectors, side shields, corner lights adjoining windshield or front side windows of such vehicle other than a certificate or other article required to be so displayed by statute or by regulations of the commissioner. No person shall drive any vehicle so constructed, equipped or loaded as to unduly interfere with the driver’s vision to the front and to the sides.” N.J.S 39-3:74.
In State v. Cohen, the Appellate Division upheld a finding of reasonable suspicion based on an officer’s observation that the front driver and passenger side windows “were so darkly tinted as to obstruct vision.” 347 N.J.Super. at 380. Relying on State v. Oberlton, 262 N.J.Super. 204 (Law Div. 1992), the court held that “N.J.S. 39:3-74 prohibits the use of tinted windows which fail to meet the applicable standard now set forth in N.J.A.C. 13:20-33.7,” which, at the time, established inspection requirements for passenger vehicles. The Appellate Division further cited “the community caretaking function” as an independent basis for the stop, because “the officer’s belief that the darkly tinted windows represented a significant obstruction” justified “inspection of what appear[ed] to be a hazardous vehicular condition that deviate[d] from the norm.” Cohen at 381.
Here, in Smith, the arresting officers observed window tint on the rear windshield of defendant’s vehicle. “Under the statute’s plain language,” held the Court, “the tint on defendant’s rear windshield could not constitute a violation of N.J.S. 39:3-74. It did not give rise to the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to justify this motor vehicle stop.” Id. Rather, the term “non-transparent,” as used in N.J.S. 39:3-74, “means that reasonable suspicion of a tinted windows violation arises when a vehicle’s front windshield or front side windows are so darkly tinted that police cannot clearly see people or articles within the car.” Id.
The facts of this case provide an example of window tint that does not meet the definition of the statutory term “non-transparent.” The officer testified that, “despite the tinting on defendant’s rear windshield, he was able to see with just the police SUV’s headlights and street lighting that there was only one person in the vehicle and that the person was making movements. Such a degree of window tint — which allows the officer to see both the number of people in the vehicle and their movements — is not ‘non-transparent’ within the meaning of the statute. In order to establish a reasonable suspicion of a tinted windows violation under N.J.S. 39:3-74, the State will therefore need to present evidence that tinting on the front windshield or front side windows inhibited officers’ ability to clearly see the vehicle's occupants or articles inside.” Id.